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ROBERT E. LOONEY AND P. C. FREDERIKSEN 
Constraints on Pakistan's industrial 
development 
A test of the infrastructural bottleneck 
hypothesis 
This paper examines the infrastructural investment bottleneck hypothesis for 
Pakistan: have shortages in infrastructure investment constrained manufacturing 
output in Pakistan, as recently suggested by the World Bank? Using Granger 
causality techniques, we find evidence that the hypothesis does hold true for 
Pakistan, although the general pattern between public sector investment and 
manufacturing output is one of little coordination between the two sectors. 
Introduction 
During the past three decades, Pakistan has enjoyed a credible economic perfor-
mance. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 5.5 
per cent between 1961 and 1988, compared to 4.7 per cent for all developing 
countries. Economic growth was particularly strong during the 1980s, with an 
average annual growth rate of 7 .0 per cent. Growth rates in large-scale and small-
scale manufacturing were 8.2 per cent and 9.2 per cent respectively. 
Despite these impressive results, some scholars feel that the expansion in 
manufacturing may be self-terminating due to a critical shortage, or 'bottleneck', of 
infrastructure, now barely adequate in the major cities and even more acute in 
smaller cities and rural areas. In particular, the lack of necessary infrastructure in 
those rural areas and small towns with an abundant labour force and inexpensive raw 
materials has seriously impeded the establishment of growth-enhancing export 
industries (Lee and Iwasaki, 1989). 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the infrastructure bottleneck hypothesis 
for Pakistan. Specifically, we will examine (a) whether or not infrastructural 
facilities have indeed lagged behind the needs for the investment caused by 
Pakistan's rapid growth, (b) what specific types of infrastructure are in short supply, 
and ( c) whether both large and small firms have been equally affected by the 
shortage in infrastructure investment. 
Pakistan's experience 
The hypothesis that shortages in infrastructure have constrained manufacturing 
output in Pakistan-and are also likely to do so in the near future-has been 
suggested in a series ofreports by the World Bank (1983, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 
1991). Briefly stated, the Bank's view is that beginning in the early 1970s several 
factors contributed to a slowdown in economic growth. Among these factors were 
the loss of a large part of the import-substitution potential in consumer industries, 
excessive protection, over-capitalisation and major infrastructural and energy 
bottlenecks (see also Sarmad, 1984 and United Nations, 1985, 7). Arguing along 
similar lines, Naqvi and Sarmad noted that a general lack of infrastructural facilities 
in the 1970s was a serious obstacle to investment growth in large-scale manufactur-
ing (Naqvi and Sarmad, 1984). 
Under the Fifth Plan (1979-83), the government assigned a leading role in 
industrial development to the private sector. Under this strategy, the government 
denationalised most agricultural processing units, made private sector investment 
easier, restricted the use of public sector investment to the completion of ongoing 
projects, liberated trade policies and introduced a wide range of industrial incentives 
(World Bank, 1983). 
When the Sixth Plan (1983-88) was introduced, it was clear to the Bank that 
infrastructure deficiencies-in energy, water, transportation and telecommuni-
cations-were a major constraint to industrial development. As the Bank noted: 
Sustained industrial growth will not be possible without rapid expansion of 
essential infrastructure, especially energy. The Plan partly addresses this 
constraint by increasing outlays for energy and water. With respect to energy, 
although the increased allocations are welcome, energy shortages will continue 
during the Sixth Plan period. (World Bank, 1983, 59) 
The report suggested that the Government should improve load-shedding (tempor-
ary 'brownouts') management and assign a high priority to the establishment of a 
modern load dispatch centre. Furthermore, the Plan assigned a high priority to 
completing and establishing new iQ.dustrial estates and developing growth points 
(World Bank, 1983, 59). 
By the time the Seventh Plan (1988-93) was enacted, the Government had 
responded to the above and had placed an increased emphasis on its industrial estate 
programme. Provisional governments were charged with providing road links, and 
the Water and Power Authority and the Telephone and Telegraph departments 
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were to set up grid stations and telephone exchanges. It was hoped to have all estates 
fully serviced by 1989-90. 1 
Increasing the efficiency and international competitiveness of the industrial sector 
was an important aspect of the recent structural adjustment plan (1989-91). In the 
World Bank's last evaluation of Pakistan's economy, it noted that market mechan-
isms were essential in guiding investment and that public sector participation in 
manufacturing and financial services should be curtailed (World Bank, 1991, 25). 
Both the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) have been monitoring the country's 
infrastructural problems. The ADB estimated that the direct cost of power output 
was approximately nine per cent for the industrial sector. The indirect cost was an 
additional Rs. 2 billion (Pasha and Gellerson, 1988). USAID has estimated that 
Pakistan is losing about $500 million of value added in manufacturing due to load-
shedding. According to USAID, Pakistan will need to double its energy capacity by 
1993 to meet the growing demand at an approximate cost of Rs. 100 billion (Arab 
Emirates Nations Industrial Development Organisation, 1990, 90). 
Recently, industrial growth in Pakistan fell sharply from 8. 7 per cent in 1988 to 3. 9 
per cent in 1989; most of the drop originated in the manufacturing sector. In large-
scale and medium-scale industries the growth rate was 1.2 per cent, the lowest rate 
since 1977. While it is tempting to place the majority of the blame for this performance 
on the lack of infrastructure, undoubtedly other factors-ethnic disturbances and 
floods, for example-have also played a major part. While industrial growth improved 
in 1990 concomitant with a substantial recovery in large-scale manufacturing, 
infrastructure bottlenecks clearly remain a major problem. Although the government 
has announced that power supplies have been expanded to ensure no load-shedding in 
1991-92, new threats to foreigners and foreign investment emerged in Sindh and 
doubts as to the availability of funds 'to finance new private investment make the 
government's assurance very doubtful (The Economist, 1991, 158). 
In summary, it is clear that industry has experienced a host of problems in recent 
years and has pushed the sector's trend growth rate well below the 1978-88 average 
of nearly 10 per cent. Infrastructure shortages are but one of the factors involved; 
deteriorating law and order in Sindh, political uncertainty, natural disasters, and a 
low savings and investment rate have all combined to dampen industrial growth. 
Causality between infrastructure and growth 
The accounts noted above suggest that in recent years infrastructure shortages have 
slowed down industrial output, but indicate little about the relative effectiveness of 
different types of infrastructure. In addition, little is known about the causal 
relationship between infrastructure investment and industrial output. On the one 
¢ hand, some economists such as Voigh (1974) maintain that causality runs from 
1 Government of Pakistan (1988). The progress of this industrial estate programme was to be 
monitored by a joint committee from the government and the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry. 
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alterations in the stock of infrastructure to investment and economic growth. On the 
other hand, economists such as Glover and Simon (1975) believe that infrastructure 
investment merely relieves 'tensions' which have resulted from imbalances between 
supply and demand patterns as well as bottleneck pressures (see also Looney and 
Frederiksen, 1981, and Frederiksen, 1981). This view suggests that the government 
invests in infrastructure only after deficiencies have severely constrained output and 
the flow of private capital to the private sector. Thus, there is the need to examine 
whether infrastructure investment prompts manufacturing output in Pakistan or 
whether infrastructure investment itself is a response to the needs created by 
manufacturing activity. Has the government taken a proactive or reactive role in 
infrastructure investment since 1971, and what can we inf er about the appropriate 
future strategy for the government of Pakistan? 
A problem facing researchers is that infrastructure is not homogeneous. Another 
problem is that infrastructure's contribution may well depend on the existing stock 
of supporting factors of production which most likely will vary in composition over 
time. A final complication has been the reluctance of researchers to discuss causality 
from a statistical perspective. While exact 'cause and effect' cannot be proved, 
several statistical tests have been introduced in recent years to indicate causal 
relationships. The original and most widely used causality test was developed by 
Granger (1969). Using regression analysis techniques, the past values of some 
variable Y are used to predict Y values. Then another variable Xis included with the 
past values of Y. If the predicted values of Y are 'improved' with the inclusion of past 
X values, then we conclude that X 'Granger causes' Y. 
As shown by LaCivita and Frederiksen (1991), the results of any Granger~ 
causality test depend on the choice of lag lengths between the dependent and 
independent variables. Hsiao (1981) has developed a systematic procedure for 
choosing optimal lag lengths for the variables in the regression equation. His method 
combines Granger causality with Akaike's final prediction error (FPE) to determine 
not only the optimum lag length, but also the causal relationships. 2 
In this paper, we apply Hsiao's procedure to test whether infrastructure 
investment (I) in Pakistan has Granger caused economic activity (G), or whether G 
has caused I. Initially, a series of autoregressive regression equations are estimated 
on the dependent variable. To start, the dependent variable is lagged one year and in 
each succeeding estimate an additional lag on the dependent variable is added. Thus 
M regression equations are estimated in the following form: 
m 
where G is economic growth and where m ranges from 1 to M. 3 For each equation, 
the FPE is computed and the optimal lag length, m*, is the lag length which 
2 Thornton and Batten (1985) found that Hsiao's method was superior to merely choosing arbitrary 
lag lengths or several other procedures for determining lag length. 
3 As was pointed out in LaCivita and Frederiksen (1991), the choice of M-the maximum lag 
length-is abritary. M should be as large as possible, consistent with the sample size and the underlying 
economic process in Pakistan. In this paper we have set M equal to 4. 
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produces the lowest FPE-the most accurate forecast. Another set of equations is 
then estimated, with lagged variables of I added sequentially as above. The FPE for 
each equation is examined to choose n*, the optimal lag length for I. This procedure 
is then duplicated, but with I as the dependent variable, and lagged variables ofl are 
introduced to find m*. Finally, lagged values of Gare included to find n* (for a more 
detailed description of the procedure, see Frederiksen, 1991). 
The causality test is made up of three steps. 
STEP 1: the FPE for the model G = f( GL) is compared to the FPE for the model 
G = f(GL, IL). If the FPE decreases, i.e. the model's predictive power increases 
as lagged values of I are added, we conclude that I Granger causes G. If the FPE 
increases, we conclude that I does not cause G. 
STEP 2: the same comparison is made when I is the dependent variable and 
lagged values of Gare added. If the FPE declines, we conclude that G causes I; 
if the FPE increases, we conclude that G does not cause I. 
STEP 3: the FPE under Steps 1and2 are compared. If the FPE increases in 
both cases, no relationship exists between G and I for Pakistan. If the FPE 
declines in both cases, a feedback relationship between I and G exists: I causes 
G which causes I, etc. Finally, if the FPE declined under Step 1 but increased 
during Step 2, we conclude that I causes G. If the FPE increased under Step 1 
but declined under Step 2, the reverse is true-G causes I. 
Empirical results 
While the government of Pakistan publishes extensive data on various types of 
public investment, the infrastructure component of this investment is not reported. 
However, it is possible to approximate increments to the country's infrastructural 
base using the approach outlined by Blejer and Khan (1985). Assuming that 
investment in infrastructure is a process which changes very slowly over time, Blejer 
and Khan's approach makes the distinction between expected investment-
assumed to be the long-term infrastructure component-and unexpected invest-
ment, which is assumed to be short-term and non-infrastructural investment. The 
expected infrastructure investment measure was calculated as a function of the 
investment in the preceding year. Thus the difference between the actual level and 
expected level of investment is 'unexpected', i.e. the short-term component. 4 The 
data on Pakistan investment were derived from World Bank data (World Bank, 1983 
and 1991). The data were expressed in real terms and deflated using the Internatio-
nal Monetary Fund's GDP deflator. 5 
4 An alternative approach calculates a trend value of (real) public sector investment which is 
assumed to represent long-term infrastructure investment. Deviations from the long-term trend (i.e. 
actual minus trend value) are assumed to represent the short-term or non-infrastructural component. 
Since we do not know the correct trend (linear or exponential), we have used the expected method to 
estimate infrastructure investment in this paper. 
5 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, Washington DC, 
International Monetary Fund, various annual issues. All data are in constant 1985 prices. 
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Our initial focus was to estimate the infrastructure component of Total Public 
Investment (government enterprises investments, e.g. railways and post offices, 
semi-public investment in large-scale manufacturing and energy, and general 
government investment in roads, schools, etc.). However, since public infrastruc-
ture investment is not usually directed towards a particular sector, five additional 
measures of investment were exammed and their respective infrastructure com-
ponent estimated. The five additional investment categories were: General Govern-
ment, Semi-Public,6 Federal Government, Provincial, and Local. For purposes of 
comparison, two measures of private investment-Total Private Investment and 
Long-Term Private Investment-were included in the analysis. 
The causal relations between the various investment measures (and their 
infrastructure component) and three measures of economic activity (total, large-
scale, and small-scale manufacturing output) are shown in Table 1 (cols. 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively). 7 The dominant pattern to emerge was a feedback relationship, 
especially between investment on the one hand and total and large-scale manufactur-
ing output on the other hand. In other words, government investment stimulated 
increased output, and this in turn led to more investment. With regard to the 
relationship between investment and total manufacturing output (Table 1, col. 1), 
total public investment provided a strong8 stimulus to output. The feedback from 
private sector activity to public investment was much weaker. General government 
investment produced a strong impact on manufacturing output. Total private 
investment had a moderate effect on economic output, but in contrast to public 
investment the feedback effect further stimulated private investment. Interestingly, 
our results indicated several instances of a negative feedback: from increased private· 
sector manufacturing activity to (a) public infrastructure investment, (b) semi-
public investment and infrastructure and ( c) general government infrastructure 
investment. These results could reflect either a crowding out of physical resources 
(manpower), which may have gone into private construction, or a financial crowding 
out where government funding has taken place through borrowing. In turn this has 
resulted in credit rationing in the private sector.9 Recently Khan and Iqbal (1991) 
have examined crowding out in Pakistan; their results are consistent with our 
interpretation of the negative feedback. 
When government investment is broken down into its sub-components, several 
differences are noted. Expanded federal government investment produced a strong 
increase in output; the federal government in turn responded weakly to the 
increased needs of the manufacturing sector. In contrast, expanded provincial 
investment and irifrastructure investment had a negative effect on output. On the 
other hand, provincial governments invested heavily following expansions in 
output. Local government infrastructure investment appeared to have produced a 
very strong follow-on increase in total manufacturing output . 
• 
6 General Government and Semi-Public Investment are sub-categories of Total Public Investment. 
7 While only the causal relationships are shown in Table 1, the entire results (estimated regression 
equations, t-statistics, and optimal lag lengths) are available from the authors on request. 
8 Based on the size of the standardised regression coefficient. 
9 Crowding out in the case of Mexico was discussed in Looney and Frederiksen (1987). 
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Table 1 Causal relationships between various investment measures (and respective infrastructure 
components) and manufacturing output, Pakistan, 1972-1990 
Manufacturing output 
Investment measure Total Large-scale Small-scale 
Infrastructure component (1) (2) (3) 


























-Local government investment 
- - -Infrastructure 
- -
~INF 
Total private investment INV-+G INV-+G ~INV· 




Notes: ~ indicates feedback between investment and economic output, G represents economic output, INV 
represents the investment measure, and INF represents the infrastructure component of INV. See text for 
discussion of the strength and sign of the relationship. 
A similar analysis was conducted to determine whether these patterns were 
consistent for different-sized manufacturing units. With regard to large-scale 
manufacturing firms (Table 1, col. 2), both total public investment and infrastruc-
ture investment produced a strong stimulus to output. In contrast to the total 
manufacturing sector, public sector infrastructure reacted weakly to higher levels of 
large-scale output. Total private investment stimulated output, but less so than 
public investment. The private sector did not appear to respond to increases in 
output with follow-on capital formation. Investment by semi-public organisations 
generated a strong expansion in output, but, as above, the response of these agencies 
to increase investment was rather weak. General government investment provided a 
small stimulus to output and was moderately responsive to the investment needs of 
the manufacturing sector. This was in contrast to total manufacturing output, where 
the feedback effect was negative. The federal government provided a strong 
stimulus to large-scale manufacturing, although weaker than in the case for total 
output. While provincial government investment did not prompt large-scale output, 
manufacturing output had a positive impact on provincial investment levels. 
Finally, investment by local governments had a fairly strong impact on manufactur-
ing but the feedback effect was weak. 
With regard to the relationship between investment and small-scale manufactur-
ing output (Table 1, col. 3), a general p~tern emerged where most government 
investment and infrastructure investment failed to stimulate the output of small-
scale firms. In fact, an opposite pattern emerged, where government investment 
reacted to changes in the output of small-scale firms. In addition, the response of the 
public sector to small-scale manufacturing was much weaker than for large-scale 
manufacturing. 
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Conclusions 
This paper has examined whether or not the recent slowdown in manufacturing 
output in Pakistan has been due to a critical shortage, or 'bottleneck', of 
infrastructure. The results suggest that infrastructure bottlenecks have indeed 
occurred in Pakistan. However, the general picture that emerges between patterns 
of public sector investment and manufacturing output is one of a lack of 
coordination between the two sectors. Although a feedback causal relationship most 
often existed between public and private sectors, our analysis suggests that public 
sector investment has had a much stronger impact on private sector activity than the 
response by government to the needs of the private sector. Furthermore, in those 
cases where the public sector did respond to the private sector requirements, more 
often than not the response seems not to have matched the requirements of the 
private sector. While some of the investment needs of the large-scale manufacturing 
sector were met by the government, this was definitely not true for the small-scale 
manufacturing sector. 
A decade ago, Naqvi and Sarmad noted that: 
Though infrastructural facilities improved substantially, many crucial 
problems still remain to be solved. An important problem was the imbalance 
between major production units, due mainly to unsatisfactory trunk connec-
tions, which impeded the distribution of additional supplies, especially outside 
the main urban centers. The solution to the problem requires a substantial 
extension of the existing transport facilities into rural areas to enable the 
manufacturing sector to respond more readily to the growth of the agricultural 
sector, and promote a more balanced regional development of the country. 
(Naqvi and Sarmad, 1984, 39) 
Our results suggest that many of the problems noted by Naqvi and Sarmad still 
remain in Pakistan today. 
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